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Abstract
This paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of multimarket compe-
tition with capacity investments, applied to international gas markets. It
identies a strategic advantage of focusedpipeline gas producers (e.g.,
Gazprom) over diversiedmultimarket exporters of liqueed natural
gas (e.g., Qatar). Based on this, the paper examines the spillover impacts
of the Fukushima nuclear accident onto European gas markets, both in
the short- and longer-term. It also discusses Russias gas export strat-
egy, especially the 2014 deals with China. More generally, the analysis
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table, and speaks
to policy discussions about security of supplyin energy markets.
Keywords: Competitive advantage, corporate diversication, liqueed
natural gas (LNG), supply security, strategic investment
JEL classications: D43 (oligopoly pricing), F12 (international trade
with imperfect competition), L25 (rm scope), L95 (natural gas)
My thanks are due to Chi Kong Chyong, James Henderson, Pår Holmberg, Rutger-Jan
Lange, Arjun Mahalingam, David Newbery, Andy Philpott, Michael Pollitt, Danny Ralph,
Thomas Tangerås, and seminar audiences at the Stockholm Research Institute of Indus-
trial Economics (IFN) and at the Cambridge Energy Policy Research Group (EPRG) for
helpful comments and discussion. Financial support from the Enel Foundation is gratefully
acknowledged. All views expressed and any errors are my responsibility.
1
1 Introduction
This paper presents an analysis of competition in natural gas markets, with an
emphasis on the strategic interaction between pipeline-based sellers, such as
Russia/Gazprom and Norway, and exporters of liqueed natural gas (LNG),
such as Qatar, Australia, and Nigeria. Following the expansion of international
trade in LNG over the last 10 years, pipeline gas and LNG now increasingly
compete head-to-head, notably in the European market. But they are also
fundamentally di¤erent. Gas pipelines are large investments with a very high
degree of asset specicity: once built, they are physically bound to a particular
route, with no alternative use (Williamson, 1985; Makholm, 2012). LNG,
on the other hand, is transported by tanker, giving exporters a choice of
markets for any cargo. From a strategic perspective, a key question is how
this di¤erence a¤ects the competitive playing eld between these two types of
exporters.
The global gas market lends itself to such an analysis for several reasons.
First, natural gas increasingly plays an important role in energy policy and
geopolitics. The US shale gas revolution has already had large knock-on e¤ects
across energy markets and economies worldwide, and the US itself looks set to
become a major LNG exporter over the coming years. The Fukushima Daiichi
accident of March 2011 highlighted the ability of exible LNG supplies to ll
the gap in Japans energy mix after its nuclear shutdown.1 Concerns over
energy security have re-emerged due to the political conict between Russia
and Ukraine; at the same time, Russia and China recently concluded the
largest-ever natural gas deal, reportedly worth US$400 billion.2
Second, there can be little doubt that the interaction between these play-
ers is of a highly strategic nature. There is signicant seller concentration
in natural gas, and its regional fragmentation into US, European and Asian
markets, with widely varying prices is, at least in part, driven by exporter
market power (Ritz, 2014).3 Moreover, it is striking that a commodity des-
tined for the same end-use in industrial production and residential heating
is supplied by two types of producers with very di¤erent technologies and or-
ganizational structures. In this way, these markets are well-suited to analysis
using the toolkit of game theory.
Third, gas is underresearched in the academic literature, certainly relative
to its cousins: electricity and oil. While economists have been inuential in
the analysis and design of electricity markets since deregulation began in the
1980s, and there is a substantial literature on the inuence of OPEC on the
performance of the crude oil market, there is much less on natural gas and
especially little that speaks to recent events. This paper attempts to ll some
of these gaps.
1Contracting arrangements have also become more exible in LNG markets over the last
decade. Traditionally, investments were backed up by long-term contracts (of around 20
years duration) between a seller and buyer. Today, trade in spot and short-term markets
makes up about 30% of global LNG sales (GIIGNL, 2013). These short-term transactions
were key to the market response to the Fukushima accident.
2Natural gas is also seen by many analysts as a pathway to achieve medium-term climate
policy targets, given that it has only half the carbon intensity of coal.
3Average gas/LNG prices in 2013 were roughly US$16 per million metric British thermal
units in Asia (Japan and South Korea), US$10/MMBtu in Europe (UK and Germany), and
US$4 in the US (at Henry Hub).
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The analysis examines a simplied version of the global gas market: A
pipeline producer, say Russia/Gazprom, sells gas to the European market
while an LNG exporter, say Qatar, sells to both European and Asian gas
consumers. The model is a two-stage game of investments in production ca-
pacities followed by quantity competition. Its key feature is that the LNG
exporter chooses how to deploy its capacity across the two markets. This cre-
ates a supply-side link between them, and allows for an analysis of how local
shocksspill over from one market into another and their implications for
competitive balance and consumer welfare.
The rst main result is that the focusedproducer (Gazprom) enjoys a
structural competitive advantage over the diversiedseller (Qatar) in their
common market. The multimarket rms optimal strategy equalizes marginal
revenues across export markets. Recognizing this, Gazprom strategically over-
expands its capacity and market share in the European market, thus depress-
ing the local price, knowing that Qatar can still employ its capacity in Asia.
This cross-market strategic e¤ect is always present; its magnitude depends on
(relative) market fundamentals. The result suggests that Gazproms tradi-
tional focus on Europe may be a source of strength, rather than a weakness
as is usually argued in policy discussions around energy security(e.g., Eu-
ropean Commission, 2014). Moreover, Gazproms role is similar to that of a
Stackelberg leader, so this constellation benets European gas buyers.4
What were the global impacts of the Fukushima accident? What were its
repercussions for European gas markets and Gazprom? The paper examines
both short-term impacts when rmscapacity levels are xed and longer-
term e¤ects when rms can re-optimize capacity in light of changes in market
conditions. The long-term impacts are driven crucially by changes in the
magnitude of the strategic e¤ect. The results suggest that, in the longer term,
an Asian LNG demand boom makes Qatar a stronger competitor in Europe.
This hurts Gazprom as well as European gas consumers, as prices rise due
to less aggressive competition (i.e., a weaker strategic e¤ect). This long-run
response di¤ers from Fukushimas short-term impact: For Qatar, in the short
run, raising sales to Asia means cutting those to Europe. This allows Gazprom
to gain further market share in the short run while it loses share over the
longer term as LNG producers invests more heavily in capacity.
The paper presents formal conditions for these results. Simple conditions
which are su¢ cient but not necessary for the long-run impacts boil down to
the following: Qatar has relatively high market power in the Asian LNG mar-
ket, and the demand boom enhances its ability to capture social surplus (thus
mitigating its strategic weakness due to multi-market exposure). These condi-
tions seem plausible in light of market experience before and after Fukushima.
They are formally equivalent to a rate of pass-through from costs to price
that is below 50% and does not rise with the demand boom. As in Weyl and
Fabinger (2013), cost pass-through is a useful way to think about competitive
interactions and the division of social surplus in di¤erent markets. However,
4Of course, the present model should not be taken to capture all the issues that are
relevant in practice; the more modest objective here is simply to point out there exists a
strategic consideration which goes against the conventional wisdom. (Gazprom assumes
a role similar to that of a Stackelberg leader even though the timing of the model has
simultaneous choices of capacities, and then outputs; the model does not examine issues of
entry deterrence and pre-emptive investment.)
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the results here are more subtle; they also depend on how pass-through might
change with a demand boom. Some of the formal conditions are similar to
those emerging in recent work on third-degree monopoly price discrimination
(Cowan, 2012).
While the exposition of this paper focuses on international gas markets, its
insights are more generally applicable. The analysis shows how a fundamental
result from the theory of imperfect competition can be overturned. In standard
oligopoly models, a more e¢ cient rm (with lower unit cost) always has higher
market share and prots. By contrast, a focused rm here can have a larger
market share than a multimarket competitor despite (much) higher costs due
to the strategic e¤ect described above.5 In contrast to the classic repeated-
game analysis of Bernheim and Whinston (1990), multimarket contact tends
to raise market competitiveness rather than facilitating tacit collusion.
This result has a similar avour to the corporate-nance literature on the
diversication discount applied to conglomerate rms by stock-market in-
vestors (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Campa and Kedia, 2002). One leading expla-
nation is that multi-business rms are susceptible to wasteful rent-seeking by
individual divisions who try to gain additional funding from corporate HQ
which has a choice of how to allocate funds across divisions (Meyer, Milgrom
and Roberts, 1992). Similarly, the disadvantage of diversied rms here arises
because headquarters has a choice of how to allocate production capacity
across export markets which can be inuenced by rivalscompetitive moves.
The results here also suggest that the diversication discount may vary with
the business cycle, and be larger during periods of market decline.
Another industry application is to airline markets. Consider the case of
Frontier Airlines in the 1980s, as described by Bulow, Geneakoplos and Klem-
perer (1985). Frontier had diversied into new markets away from its original
Denver hub. Following this, other airlines began to compete more aggressively
in the Denver market. The present analysis o¤ers an explanation: diversi-
cation gave Frontier a choice of where to deploy its airline eet, allowing
its competitors to expand by gaining a Stackelberg-type position at Denver.
(This holds unless Frontier was able to extract all social surplus in new mar-
kets, which is highly unlikely.) More generally, the model gives a reason for
why focused new entrants, especially low-cost carriers such as Southwestern,
have enjoyed a strategic advantage over large incumbent airlines.
In examining how local shocks spill over to other markets, this paper re-
lates to a growing literature on networks and networkedmarkets. There has
recently been a renewed interest in how production networks lead to the prop-
agation of shocks around a system (Carvalho, 2014). An oft-cited example is
the Fukushima accident, with its repercussions for global supply chains in au-
tomotives and electronics, amongst others.6 While the modelling approaches
5The model presented here builds on (and extends parts of) Shelegia (2012) who empha-
sized how competition between two rms in a given market can be inuenced by a third rm
competing in another market. This paper allows demand conditions to vary across markets
and rms to be heterogeneous in terms of production and capacity costs. It also addresses
di¤erent questions, while highlighting the application to international gas markets.
6Perhaps closest the the present paper, Bimpikis, Ehsani and Ilkilic (2014) present a
model of Cournot competition in networked markets, and examine how local shocks, such
as new entry in part of the network, have implications for the entire structure of the network.
They use natural gas markets as their rst motivating example for their theory.
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taken in this literature are di¤erent, the underlying economic issues are closely
related to those considered here.
Finally, this paper takes also a di¤erent approach to the bulk of the exist-
ing literature on natural gas markets, which is dominated by a small number
of large-scale numerical models.7 These are well-suited to policy analysis via
numerical simulation of scenarios in terms of gas demand, investment volumes,
etc. However, their complexity means that it can be di¢ cult to understand
what is driving the numbers. The present paper instead derives analytical
results from a simplied model, with an emphasis on the microeconomic in-
tuition.8 In related work, Growitsch, Hecking and Panke (2014) simulate a
large global gas oligopoly model to explore the potential impact of a (hypo-
thetical) blockage of LNG tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. Their analysis also
emphasizes supply-side concentration and the transmission of shocks across
regional markets. Newbery (2008) also uses a simple microeconomic model to
argue that climate-change policy in form of an emissions trading scheme can
exacerbate market power issues in natural gas.9
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model, and
Section 3 solves for the equilibrium. Section 4 presents the result on the
competitive advantage of focusedrms. Section 5 examines the cross-market
impact of a demand shift, motivated by Fukushima. Section 6 applies these
insights to understand Russias evolving gas export strategy, especially the
2014 deals with China. Section 7 concludes. (Proofs are in the Appendix.)
2 Setup of the model
Firm 1 sells to both export markets, A and B, with outputs denoted by x1; y1.
Firm 2 can sell only into market B, with sales of y2.
Demand conditions are as follows. For simplicity, market B has a linear
inverse demand curve pB(y1; y2) =    (y1 + y2). Market A has a general
demand curve pA(x1); let A   x1pAxx=pAx denote its curvature coe¢ cient.
(So demand in market A is concave if A < 0 () pAxx < 0, and convex
otherwise.) Direct demand is assumed to be log-concave, A < 1 (Bagnoli
and Bergstrom, 2005). This is a common assumption in models of imperfect
competition which ensures that second-order conditions are always satised.
Competition between rms is therefore in strategic substitutes (Bulow, Ge-
neakoplos and Klemperer, 1985).
The game has two stages. In the rst stage, rms simultaneously invest in
7A representative but non-exhaustive list includes Egging, Gabriel, Holz and Zhuang
(2008), Holz, von Hirschhausen and Kemfert (2008), and Chyong and Hobbs (2014).
8A disadvantage of the present approach is that it yields only comparative-statics results
rather than realistic-looking numbers of the global gas market as a whole. Another di¤erence
is that existing large-scale models are typically mixed complementarity problems solved
as open loop equilibria, in which capacity and production decision are, in e¤ect, made
simultaneously; the analysis here instead derives a closed loopequilibrium in which rms
capacity decisions have a strategic impact on subsequent play.
9Taking a di¤erent approach, based on cooperative game theory, Hubert and Ikonnikova
(2011) examine the power structure in the Russian pipeline network, focusing on the balance
between Russia and transit countries such as Belarus and Ukraine. Their approach has the
advantage of incorporating bargaining power of both buyers and sellers while the present
paper focuses on seller power. See also Elliott (2014) for a related network model which
focuses on relationship-specic investments between trading partners.
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production capacities, K1 and K2, respectively at unit costs of capacity r1 > 0
and r2 > 0. Firm 1 can use its capacity in both export markets. In the second
stage, rms simultaneously decide how much output to sell into markets A
and B, at unit costs of production c1  0 and c2  0, subject to their installed
production capacities. These unit costs of production can be interpreted as
including shipping and other transportation costs. Choices are observable to
players, and there is no discounting.
Firms maximize their respective prots and the equilibrium concept is
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Assume throughout that demand and cost
conditions are such that both rms are active in equilibrium, selling positive
amounts to their respective export markets; standing assumptions are  >
rj + cj for j = 1; 2, cj < 12( + ci) for j 6= i, pA(0) > r1 + c1 and pA(x1) < 0
at su¢ ciently high x1. Also assume that both producers sell up to capacity
in Stage 2.10 Conditions on parameter values which ensure these assumptions
are met are given in Lemma 1.
Application to international gas markets. Think of market A as the
Asian gas market with Japan and South Korea (JKM spot price for LNG)
in mind especially and market B as Europe. Firm 1 is an LNG exporter,
such as Qatar, serving both markets.11 Firm 2 is a pipeline seller, such as
Gazprom/Russia, focused on the European market.
The model is an abstraction of the following situation.12 Globally, gas
trade is around 70% by pipeline and 30% as LNG.13 Russia is the worlds 2nd
largest producer of gas, with Gazprom controlling around 75% of production
and holding a legal monopoly on exports of piped gas. Of its pipeline exports,
over 80% go to European markets (the remainder goes to countries of the
former Soviet Union, some of which also perform a transit role).14 Qatar is
the worlds largest LNG exporter with a global market share of over 30%. Its
two largest LNG destinations are Europe (especially UK and Italy) and Asia
(especially Japan and South Korea), with a split of around 25% and 75%.
(The US is now the worlds largest gas producer but has little trade exposure
(beyond Canada) given its current lack of LNG export infrastructure.)
From the European viewpoint, around 80% of total gas imports are by
pipeline and 20% as LNG. Around 40% of Europes total gas consumption
is met via Russian pipelines, and the majority of imports come from Russia.
LNG plays a particularly important role for the UK, Italy, and Spain (for
which LNG imports can exceed pipeline trade), and close to 50% of European
LNG imports come from Qatar. This papers focus on the balance of power
10The assumption that producers are capacity-constrained considerably simplies the
analysis. In e¤ect, it reduces the dimensionality of the problem from ve choice vari-
ables (two capacity choices plus three output choices) to three.
11Other multimarket LNG exporters serving both Europe and Asia include Algeria
(Sonatrech), Nigeria, Peru, and Trinidad & Tobago.
12This summary is based on data from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014.
13The LNG value chain includes the exploration and production of natural gas, subsequent
liquefaction, shipping, and its regasication at the receiving end. All parts of the chain
require signicant capital outlay (or charter arrangements), and maintenance expenditure
plays an important role, especially for o¤shore infrastructure. For pipeline gas, exploration
and production is followed by pipeline transportation (usually but not always onshore).
14Russias exports are around 95% by pipeline; the role of its (small) LNG exports is
discussed in Section 6.
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between Russia and Qatar as the key suppliers is consistent with industry
analysis (Stern and Rogers, 2014). By contrast, many Asian countries rely
heavily on LNG imports given the lack of pipeline infrastructure (with the
main exception of China); LNG makes up 100% of Japanese and South Korean
gas imports, and Japan is the worlds largest LNG importer, with Qatar as
its top supplier.
Other modelling assumptions reect market conditions in global gas. The
setup allows LNG and pipeline producers to have di¤erent cost structures,
both in terms of production and investment. It assumes that Qatar has iden-
tical production costs for the European and Asian markets; this is a reasonable
assumption as the respective transport costs are indeed very similar in prac-
tice, mainly since the shipping distances are roughly equal. There is no price
arbitrage between markets A and B by third-party traders; the equilibrium
may thus feature price di¤erentials resulting from international price discrimi-
nation by producers. This is in line with experience in global gas markets (see
note 3). Choices in Stage 1 can be interpreted as investments in production
capacity; more generally, these reect any kind of longer-term decisions, such
as maintenance expenditure or procurement/chartering of other parts of in-
frastructure, which occur before short-run sales. Finally, the assumption that
rms sell up to capacity in Stage 2 is reasonable for the natural gas industry,
in which any capacity that is operational is typically also fully used.15
3 Solving the model
Dene rmsrevenue functions across the two markets, RA1 (x1) = p
Ax1 and
RB1 (y1; y2) = p
By1, RB2 (y1; y2) = p
By2. Also dene the corresponding mar-
ginal revenues MRA1 (x1) =
@
@x1
 
pAx1

= pA + pAx x1 and MR
B
1 (y1; y2) =
@
@y1
 
pBy1

= pB   y1, MRB2 (y1; y2) = @@y2
 
pBy2

= pB   y2.
3.1 Stage 2: Output decisions
Consider rmsoutput choices in Stage 2, given the capacity investments of
Stage 1. By assumption, producers are capacity-constrained, implying that
rm 1s sales satisfy x1 + y1 = K1, while y2 = K2 for rm 2. The main
question at this stage, therefore, is how rm 1 splits its sales across markets.
Clearly, rm 1 maximizes its prots by equating the contribution at the
margin of each market. That is, it chooses a sales strategy (x1; y1) that
equalizes marginal revenue, net of the short-run marginal cost of produc-
tion, for each market: MRA1 (x1)   c1 = MRB1 (y1; y2)   c1 () MRA1 (x1) =
MRB1 (y1; y2). Since the rms are capacity-constrained, the equilibrium con-
dition can be rewritten in terms of capacities:
MRA1 (K1   y1) =MRB1 (y1;K2): (1)
15The application to gas markets is stylized in other respects. This includes the absence
of intertemporal considerations on resource extraction à la Hotelling (sell today, or leave in
the ground and perhaps sell tomorrow), as well as gas storage. Furthermore, the capacity in-
vestments made by producers are not exactly simultaneous in practice; for example, Russian
pipelines in many cases preceded the LNG investments of other players.
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Note that rm 1s choice of output to market B thus depends on the capacity
installed by its rival, rm 2. This plays a crucial role, and is examined more
closely, in what follows.
By contrast, for rm 2, y2 = K2, irrespective of rm 1s actions. The key
di¤erence is that, having made their investments, rm 1 has an alternative use
for its capacity while rm 2 does not.
To summarize, given capacities K = (K1;K2), rmsoutput choices are
x1(K), y1(K), and y2(K) = K2.
3.2 Stage 1: Capacity decisions
Anticipating these output decisions, consider rmsdecisions to invest in ca-
pacity at Stage 1. Firm 1 chooses its investment so as to maximize its joint
prots across both export markets:
max
K1

RA1 (x1(K)) +R
B
1 (y1(K); y2(K))  r1K1   c1[x1(K) + y1(K)
	
;
which makes explicit the indirect dependency of its revenues and production
costs on both rmscapacity choices. The rst-order condition is:
0 =MRA1
@x1
@K1
+MRB1
@y1
@K1
  r1   c1

@x1
@K1
+
@y1
@K1

: (2)
This condition can be simplied. First, since the rm is capacity-constrained,
@x1=@K1 + @y1=@K1 = 1; in other words, total sales across both markets rise
one-for-one with capacity. Second, from (1), the rm equates marginal revenue
across markets, MRA1 =MR
B
1 . This shows that the multi-market rm invests
in capacity such that
MRA1 =MR
B
1 = r1 + c1; (3)
where the right-hand side is its combined unit cost of capacity and production,
i.e., its long-run marginal cost.
So the outcome in market A is the monopoly price given marginal cost
r1 + c1. Denoting the associated monopoly output by xm, it follows that
x1 = xm, and so y1 = K1   xm.
Firm 2 chooses its capacity investment to:
max
K2

RB2 (y1(K); y2(K))  r2K2   c2y2(K)
	
The rst-order condition is:
0 =MRB2
@y2
@K2
+
@RB2
@y1
@y1
@K2
  r2   c2 @y2
@K2
: (4)
Analogously to the previous rm, @y2=@K2 = 1, due to the binding capacity
constraint. Note also @RB2 =@y1 =  y2 given the linear demand structure of
market B. Dene the strategic e¤ectconnecting markets   ( @y1=@K2).
Thus simplifying the rst-order condition gives:
MRB2 + y2 = r2 + c2: (5)
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3.3 The strategic e¤ect connecting markets, cost pass-through,
and market power
Firm 2 recognizes that its capacity choice a¤ects the product-market behav-
iour of rm 1 in their common market B. Totally di¤erentiating the equal-
marginal-revenues condition from (1) shows that the strategic e¤ect satises:
 

  @y1
@K2

=
@MRA1
@K2
  @MRB1@K2
@MRA1
@y1
  @MRB1@y1
=
"

2 + ( pAx )
 
2  A
#
2 (0; 12); (6)
and observe that
  pAx   2  A is the absolute value of the slope of the
marginal revenue curve of rm 1 in market A,
 @@x1MRA1 .16 This e¤ect raises
the marginal return to rm 2 of installing an additional unit of capacity and
so, in equilibrium, MRB2 < r2 + c2.
The  term captures how strongly rm 2 can induce rm 1 to cut back
output in market B. This e¤ect is always present unless, in the limiting cases,
either  ! 0 or   pAx   2  A ! 1 . The case with  ! 0 corresponds to
market B becoming very large (relative to market A). In such situations, rm
1 nds this market very attractive, and therefore only reluctantly redirects
output away from it, and so  is small. The case with
  pAx  very large
corresponds to consumers in market A being very price-insensitive; a small
reduction in price only induces little additional demand. Finally,
 
2  A
very large, that is, A !  1, corresponds to very concave demand in market
A in the limit, the demand curve becomes rectangular (so all consumers have
almost the same willingness-to-pay).
The degree of monopoly power that rm 1 has in market A is key to
understanding the strategic e¤ect. An index of monopoly power equals the
inverse of the rate of cost pass-through, 1=A = (2   A), where the pass-
through coe¢ cient A  dpA=dMC measures by how much the equilibrium
price responds to a change in marginal cost (Bulow and Peiderer, 1983). The
assumption of log-concave demand A < 1 means that pass-through lies below
100%. For a monopolist, the inverse rate of pass-through is equal to the ratio
of rm prots to consumer surplus (Weyl and Fabinger, 2013).17
In the limit, as pass-through tends to zero, the monopolist extracts all the
available gains from the trade in market A; thus, there is no distortion below
the rst-best level of output. In this situation, there is no scope for rm 2
to strategically inuence its decision-making, as it will not deviate from its
preferred level of output, and so  = 0. Intuitively, with such pronounced
market power, rm 1 will be very careful to divert additional units to market
16The nal equality uses that @MRA1 =@K2 = 0 (rm 2s actions have no direct impact
on revenues in market A), @MRB1 =@K2 = @MR
B
1 =@y2, @MR
A
1 =@y1 =  @MRA1 =@x1, as
well as the denition of demand curvature A   x1pAxx=pAx . To understand the ex-
pression, note that a small increase dK2 > 0 lowers 1s marginal revenue in market B
by dMRB1 = (@MR
B
1 =@y2)(dK2) =  (dK2) < 0. By how much does y1 need to ad-
just to restore optimality? Cutting y1 both raises MRB1 and lowers MR
A
1 ; specically,
dMRB1 =  2(dy1) > 0 and dMRA1 =
  pAx   2  A (dy1) < 0, thus leading to the expres-
sion for .
17The rate of pass-through has no necessary relationship with the conventional price elas-
ticity of demand. Recall that a monopolist facing a linear demand curve extracts 50% of
the potential social surplus (with 25% left each as consumer surplus and deadweight loss),
regardless of the particular equilibrium value of the price elasticity of demand.
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A and depress price there. By contrast, an almost perfectly competitive
seller with little market power would be almost indi¤erent to selling more to
market A, and can thus be more easily manipulated in its decision-making.
3.4 Summary of the equilibrium
Firm 1s output in market A is at the monopoly level, x1 = xm. By assumption
rm 2 sells up to capacity, y2 = K2, and rm 1 uses all of its capacity across
markets, K1 = xm + y1. So only two unknowns are left: y1 and K2.
The following result gives the equilibrium values ( bK; bx1; by1; by2), together
with a parameter condition which ensures that the equilibrium, for both rms,
(i) is an interior solution with strictly positive outputs to each market, and
(ii) involves production up to installed capacity.
Lemma 1. Suppose the following condition on parameter values holds:
(r1 + c1) 2
 
[2 (r2 + c2)  ] ;min

1
3 [+ 2 (r2 + c2)] ; [2 (3r2 + c2)  ]
	
:
The equilibrium in rmscapacity investments and production volumes is given
by: bx1 = xmby1 = [(2  ) (  r1   c1)  (  r2   c2)]
(3  2)bK1 = bx1 + by1bK2 = by2 = [2 (  r2   c2)  (  r1   c1)]
(3  2)
where xm solves MRA1 (xm) = r1+c1, and the equilibrium value of the strategic
e¤ect satises
 =
"

2 + ( pAx )
 
2  A
#
x1=bx1
:
Equilibrium prices follow as bpA = pA(bx1) and bpB =   (by1 + by2).
The parameter condition in terms of rm 1s long-run marginal cost, r1+c1,
is su¢ cient for the equilibrium to obtain as described in Lemma 1. It is stated
in a way that is independent of the value of the strategic e¤ect  2 (0; 12).
Importantly, therefore, this condition does not depend on the details of the
equilibrium in market A; it varies only with the rmsmarginal costs and the
state of demand in market B. Later on, this will facilitate the analysis of the
cross-market impacts of changes in A on B.18
18To see that this leaves room for manoeuvre in terms of parameter values, consider the spe-
cial case where both rms have an identical cost structure with c1 = c2 = c and r1 = r2 = r.
The three individual conditions then collapse into two, and become r 2   1
5
(  c) ; (  c).
In this setting, r + c <  is always satised since there would otherwise be no gains from
trade in market B. Intuitively, the requirement that r > 1
5
(  c) ensures that the unit cost
of capacity is su¢ ciently high such the rmsdo not install too much capacity and thus
end up using all of it. To see another example, let  = 1 with zero production costs cj = 0
for j = 1; 2. Then the condition becomes r1 2
 
2r2   1;min

1
3
(2r2 + 1); 6r2   1
	
, and it
is easy to check that there is a substantial set of values for r1; r2 which satises this. For
instance, if r2 = 14 , then any r1 2 (0; 12 ) works.
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4 Competitive advantage of focusedpipeline gas
over multimarket LNG exporters
The rst key result is that a rm which is focused on a single export market
enjoys a competitive advantage in that market. The reason is the presence of
the strategic e¤ect: rm 2 has an incentive to overexpand capacity and sales
to market B, knowing that rm 1 has an alternative use for its capacity in
market A. This e¤ect operates in an asymmetric fashion since rm 2 has no
such outside option.
A natural measure of competitive advantage is the relative market share
of the two rms in their common export market B (using Lemma 1):
by1by2 = [(2  ) (  r1   c1)  (  r2   c2)][2 (  r2   c2)  (  r1   c1)] ; (7)
where the rm with a higher market share is said to have a competitive advan-
tage. Note that the standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium is nested as a special
case where the strategic e¤ect from multi-market contact is zero,  = 0. This
leads to the following result:
Proposition 1. For market B, in equilibrium:
(a) Firm 2s market share and prots rise with the strategic e¤ect , while the
price and rm 1s prots fall;
(b) Firm 2s market share and prots are higher than under Cournot-Nash
competition, while the price and rm 1s prots are lower;
(c) Firm 2 has a competitive advantage over rm 1 despite a cost disadvantage
whenever (r2 + c2) 2 ((r1 + c1); 13 [+ (3  )(r1 + c1)]).
Multi-market interaction can overturn a fundamental result from oligopoly
theory: that high market share goes hand in hand with low marginal cost (i.e.,
rmsmarket shares and e¢ ciency levels are co-monotonic). This applies in
all common (single-market) oligopoly models, including Cournot (quantity)
and Bertrand (price) competition, as well as spatial competition models such
as Hotelling, and the supply-function equilibrium (SFE) models often used to
analyze electricity markets (see Vives 2000 for a useful overview).19
In the present model, by contrast, rm 2 can have a larger share of the
market even if it has a signicantly higher marginal cost. To illustrate, let
the demand parameter  = 30, rm 2s marginal cost r2 = 5 and c2 = 5, so
(r2 + c2) = 10, and the equilibrium value of the strategic e¤ect  = 13 . (Note
that it is possible to obtain any  2 (0; 12) by appropriate choice of .) Then,
whenever rm 1s long-run marginal cost (r1 + c1) 2 (712 ; 10), rm 2 retains
a higher share of market B. So its cost can be over 30% higher than that of
the multi-market rm. (The parameter condition of Lemma 1 is satised for
these values.) If the rms have identical costs, r1+ c1 = r2+ c2, rm 2 enjoys
a competitive advantage with a market share of almost 67%, as  ! 12 , and
prots in market B that are twice as high as its rivals.
19Proposition 1 generalizes to asymmetric cost structures a result due to Shelegia (2012)
who showed that a multi-market competitor may have a smaller market share than an
otherwise identical single-market rm with the same cost structure.
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Strategic considerations enable rm 2 to take on a quasi-Stackelberg leader
role. It recognizes that overinstallingcapacity in stage 1 induces its multi-
market competitor to cede market share in stage 2. This aggressive move
benets consumers in market B, just as in the usual Stackelberg setting. The
di¤erence is that rms here make choices simultaneously rather than sequen-
tially, so the strategic advantage is due to an asymmetry in organizational
structure rather than an asynchronous timing of moves.
Applied to competition in international gas markets, the result suggests
that Gazprom enjoys two sources of competitive advantage over Qatar in the
European market. First, it is likely true that it has lower costs (including
both production and transportation costs), leading to a standard e¢ ciency-
based advantage. Second, and thus magnifying the cost argument, it enjoys
the strategic advantage identied here.
In contrast to many energy policy discussions, this analysis highlights that
Gazproms dependency on the European market may be a source of strength
rather than a weakness, as is usually claimed. Moreover, European gas cus-
tomers actually benet from Gazprom having a large market share.
This also shows a limitation to the common practice of using Herndahl
concentration indices to measure security of supplyin energy markets (e.g.,
European Commission, 2014). Here, assuming that Gazprom has (weakly)
lower costs, r2+c2  r1+c1 (and hence a larger market share, by2 > by1), a higher
value of the strategic e¤ect raises the Herndahl index (= (by21+by22)=(by1+by2)2).
But this makes European gas buyers better o¤ with greater consumption at
a lower price. Sometimes a higher Herndahl index may be good for supply
security.
5 Global e¤ects of the Fukushima nuclear accident
The Fukushima Daiichi accident of March 2011 led to a large-scale shutdown
of Japanese nuclear reactors. This sharply raised the demand for substi-
tute energy sources, with LNG imports rising by around 25% while prices
increased by over 50%.20 While these locale¤ects of Fukushima seem fairly
straightforward, what are its global repercussions in particular, what are
the knock-on e¤ects for the European market?
Consider the impact of an upward shift in demand conditions in market A,
both on the equilibrium in market A itself as well as spillovers onto market B.
Formally, write demand in market A as pA(x1; ), where  is a shift parameter,
and assume pA > 0 (everywhere, for simplicity), so a higher  raises consumers
willingness-to-pay (WTP). Note that a demand shock can both change the
shape of the demand curve and lead to a movement along it.
5.1 Local e¤ects on the domestic market
Before turning to the main question at hand, it is important to establish
the impact of stronger demand in market A on market A itself. However
20Total LNG imports to Japan were 70.9 million metric tons in 2010, rising to 88.1mt in
2012 (GIIGNL, 2013), while the average import price in 2010 was US$10.91 and US$16.75 by
2012 (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014). The share of nuclear energy in Japans
power generation mix fell from 30% to zero, while that of LNG imports rose from 30% to
almost half. (The remainder of the gap was lled by coal and oil.)
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intuitive, it is not always true that a demand shift that raises consumersWTP
also raises price and output.
The following result characterizes the set of conditions under which the
expectedlocal e¤ects prevail. Let A  d log pA =d log x1 denote the elasticity
of the higher WTP with respect to market output.
Lemma 2. (a) In market A, in equilibrium, a demand shift from 0 to 00
raises output bx1(00) > bx1(0) if and only ifZ 00
0

pA (1 + 
A
 )
( pAx )(2  A)

x1=bx1 d > 0,
and raises price bpA1 (00) > bpA1 (0) if and only ifZ 00
0
 
pA

(1  A)  A

(2  A)
!
x1=bx1
d  0.
(b) A su¢ cient condition for output to rise is A >  1 for all  2 [0; 00],
and a su¢ cient condition for the price to rise is A < (1   A)=A for all
 2 [0; 00].
In sum, both of the expected local e¤ects go through as long as the elas-
ticity A is not too large either way. In other words, the jump in WTP is not
allowed to vary too much across consumers. These conditions are necessary
and su¢ cient in the case of a small (i.e., innitesimal) shift in demand, and
su¢ cient with a large (i.e., discrete) demand shift. They are always met, for
example, if demand takes the form pA =  + f(x1) so that WTP is raised
uniformly (so A  0), and more likely to be satised the lower the rate
of cost pass-through A. For the equilibrium quantity to rise, the demand
shift must not only raise WTP, pA > 0, but also raise marginal revenue,
A >  1() @@MRA1 > 0.
The response of the Japanese energy sector to Fukushima gives an oppor-
tunity to calibrate (unobserved) demand parameters. This event no doubt
qualied as a large shift in Japans LNG import demand. Furthermore, the
observed market response suggests that its impact on buyersWTP satises
the conditions of Lemma 2, in terms of A and 
A (equivalently, A).
5.2 Global spillover e¤ects to other markets
Now turn to the main question: How does a demand shock in market A
spill over to market B? The answer will depend on the timeframe under
consideration. The analysis begins with the short-run response, in which rms
global capacity levels are xed. Then it examines the longer-term response,
in which rms can optimally adjust their capacity levels.
5.2.1 Short-term responses with xed capacities
In the short run, both rmscapacities are xed at the levels that were optimal
with respect to the initialstate of demand in market A. So rms can only
re-optimize their output choices in light of new market conditions.
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For simplicity, suppose that the new short-run equilibrium features in-
terior solutions, that is, both rms continue serve each of their markets. This
is consistent with gas industry experience following Fukushima. Also assume,
as is standard, that rms engage in Nash behaviour.
Proposition 2. Suppose that A >  1 for all  2 [0; 00]. In the short run,
with xed capacities, a demand shift from 0 to 00 in market A increases rm
2s market share and the price in market B.
The reason for the result is as follows. The demand boom in market A
makes it relatively more attractive to rm 1 (see Lemma 2) thus inducing
it redirect capacity from B to A (since it was already selling up to capacity
before). For rm 2, there is no direct change in its demand conditions, as
it serves only market B; its position changes only in that rm 1 sells less
to market B. This, as such, induces it to increase its own sales but this is
impossible given its (already binding) capacity constraint. So total sales to
market B decline, and the local price and rm 2s market share rise. Since
overall demand conditions have improved, the rms still do best by selling up
to capacity although the spread across export markets has shifted.
Applied to international gas markets following the Fukushima accident,
these results suggests that both Asian and European prices rise at least in
the short run. This is due to their connection via the global export capacities
of LNG producers, who, in turn, cede market share in Europe to pipeline gas.
An implication is that Fukushima made European gas buyers worse o¤.
5.2.2 Longer-term responses with optimal capacities
In the longer term, rms will be able to adjust their capacity levels in such a
way that they are optimal given the new global market fundamentals. What,
then, is the long-run impact on market B of the demand boom in market A?
Formally, compare the equilibrium of the two-stage game, with capacity
investments followed by quantity choices, at the initial demand level 0 with
that following the demand shift 00, under the maintained assumption that
rms always produce up to their respective capacities.21
From the previous discussion with optimal capacities (see Lemma 1), the
only cross-market e¤ect comes via possible changes in the magnitude of the
strategic e¤ect. Writing ()   = 2 +   pAx ()  2  A(), the key
issue is how changes in  a¤ect the term
  pAx   2  A, that is, determining
the sign of dd
  pAx   2  A = dd [ slope of marginal revenue curve A].
The case with linear demand serves as a useful benchmark. If demand
in market A is everywhere linear (i.e., its curvature A = 0 for all x1), then  pAx   2  A =  2pAx is just a constant. (Note that then also A = 0.) In
this case, the demand shift is strategically neutral, i.e., 0() = 0 for all .
As a result, the equilibrium in market B is unchanged in the long run when
rms optimally adjust capacity (and market A is a¤ected as per Lemma 2).
21The analysis does not consider a fully dynamic model in which there is a time-dependence
of the capital stock. The technique employed here can be justied on various grounds. For
example, it corresponds to a setting in which capacity depreciates after each period, so rm
1 rst invests given low demand, and then must make a new investment given high demand.
Alternatively, the setup ts the interpretation of capacity as maintenance expenditure, which
is required period by period. Solving a fully dynamic version of the model looks hard.
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More generally, however, the demand shock will not be strategically neu-
tralfor market B. The following result gives a general condition to sign the
e¤ect, and a set of simple conditions which are su¢ cient for the demand shock
to weaken the cross-market connection.
Proposition 3. (a) A demand shift from 0 to 00 in market A weakens the
strategic e¤ect (00)  (0) if and only if:
Z 00
0
0@[pAx1  A + 2A +   pAx  ddA]
[2 + ( pAx ) (2  A)]2
1A
x1=bx1
d  0:
(b) Su¢ cient conditions for 
 
00

< 
 
0

are that, for all  2 [0; 00],
cost pass-through is su¢ ciently low, A < 12
 
1 + A
 1
, and non-increasing,
dA=d  0.
The former condition is certainly met if A < 12 (if and only if demand
is concave, A < 0) and the impact of the demand increase on consumers
willingness-to-pay satises A  0 (if and only if pAx  0).
Combining Propositions 1(a) and 3 leads directly to:
Proposition 4. In the long run, with optimal capacities, a demand shift from
0 to 00 in market A increases the price but decreases rm 2s market share
in market B, under the conditions of Proposition 3.
Under these conditions, the demand boom in market A means that rm 1
becomes less strategically vulnerable to aggressive overexpansion by its focused
competitor in their common market B. Because competition in market B
becomes less aggressive, consumers there lose out.
Loosely put, the conditions of Proposition 3 are met when rm 1 already
has relatively high market power equivalently, lowpass-through in mar-
ket A, and this market power tends to be further strengthened by the demand
boom. Very simple su¢ cient conditions are that its rate of pass-through is
less than 50% and that this rate does not rise following the shift in demand
conditions. This is su¢ cient combined with a non-negative cross-partial on
the impact of the demand shift on consumersWTP, pAx  0. To understand
this, think of it as @@x1
 
pA
  0: WTP increases for all consumers but tends
to rise more strongly for consumers who have a higher WTP in the rst place
(i.e., those with lower q on the demand curve). Again, this is consistent
with the idea that the demand shift raises rm 1s ability to capture surplus
in market A.22
The conditions identied seem relatively plausible for the case of Asian
LNG imports, especially by Japan. To begin with, it is commonly assumed
in the analysis of natural gas markets that demand curves are concave (e.g.,
Doane, McAfee, Nayyar and Williams, 2008). The argument, applied to LNG,
goes as follows: At very high prices, buyers will prefer to access substitute
sources of energy, such as those linked to oil or coal prices. It follows that,
22The condition from Proposition 3(b) A < 1
2
 
1 + A
 1 () A <  A=2, for all
 2 [0; 00], implies that price rises in market A, bpA1 (00) > bpA1 (0) (using Lemma 2, since
A <  A=2 =) A < 1  A as A < 1).
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at high prices, the demand curve for LNG imports is almost at. Conversely,
the amount of LNG imports is constrained by the existence and availability
of regasication terminals (which are needed to allow consumption). In prac-
tice, therefore, the existing regasication capacity places a cap on the feasible
import quantity. In other words, the e¤ective demand curve for LNG is
essentially vertical in the vicinity of the cap. Taken together, this suggests a
concave overall shape of the LNG import demand curve.
The presence of such a concave demand curve means that LNG exporters
enjoy signicant pricing power, which again seems consistent with recent mar-
ket experience in Asian LNG. In the present model, if consumersmaximum
WTP satises pA(0)   and Gazproms long-run marginal cost is no greater
than that of Qatari LNG, r2 + c2  r1 + c1, then concave demand in market
A with A < 0 implies that the equilibrium price in market A (Asia) is
indeed higher than in market B (Europe), bpA > bpB. (Since then demand
conditions are more tilted towards the seller in market A, and, of course, there
is an additional seller in market B.)
Proposition 4 therefore suggests that, in the longer term, Qatar benets
twice from the demand shift due Fukushima. First, there is the obvious di-
rect gain in the Asian market due to higher LNG imports at a higher price
(Lemma 2). Second, and less obviously, the demand shift in Asia makes Qatar
a stronger competitor in the European market precisely because it facilitates
capturing value in Asia.23
Another perspective on these results is as follows. The key is how the
demand shift  a¤ects the marginal revenue curve of the monopolist in market
A. This determines both the local impact on market A, as well as, via the
strategic e¤ect, the spillover e¤ect onto market B. The conditions of Lemma 2
ensure that higher  raises the monopolists marginal revenue. The conditions
of Proposition 3 ensure that higher  steepens the slope of the monopolists
marginal revenue curve. This makes her less prone to redirecting sales away
from market A due to a weakened strategic e¤ect.
To close this discussion, it is worth stressing two points. Firstly, the con-
ditions identied in Proposition 3(b) in short, low and non-increasing pass-
through are only grossly su¢ cient for a weakened strategic e¤ect, and hence
the result of Proposition 4. The conclusions also go through as long as these
conditions hold for a su¢ ciently large portion of the interval [0; 00] but not
everywhere so demand could be convex in some places. Proposition 3(a)
makes this statement precise. Secondly, it is also true that there are coun-
terexamples. In such cases, the demand shift strengthens the strategic e¤ect,
and the result of Proposition 4 would ip. The discussion here suggests that
these counterexamples are less likely in the case of the global gas market.
23As an example, suppose that the demand curve in market A takes the form pA(x1; ) =
   (x1), where initially 0 = 1 and following the demand shift 00 = 1. In other words,
initial demand is linear and then becomes rectangular in the limit, enabling the monopolist
to extract the entire social surplus. It is easy to check that the implied strategic e¤ect
(0) = 1
4
while (00) = 0. Assuming that the rms have identical costs, relative market
shares in market B initially satisfy by1=by2 = 78 , so the focused rm has market share of around
54% and makes a higher prot. Following the demand shift, market shares and hence prots
are split evenly. (Strictly speaking, this example violates the technical assumption pA > 0,
since pA = 0 at x1 = 0 but it illustrates the economic forces at work.)
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5.2.3 Comparing short- and long-term responses
Propositions 2 and 4 identify similarities and di¤erences between the short-run
and long-run multimarket e¤ects of the demand shock.
The key prediction is that short- and long-run responses di¤er in terms of
the competitive playing eld in the rmscommon market B. In the short
term, by Proposition 2, rm 1 cedes market share as it redirects capacity to
market A. However, in the longer term, this is reversed: Under the conditions
of Proposition 4, rm 1 invests in additional capacity to the extent that it
gains share in market B. Fukushima thus benets Russian gas exports to
Europe in the short run but harms them in the longer run.
The main similarity is that European gas consumers lose out both in the
short- and long-run. However, the reasons for these two conclusions di¤er. In
the short term, European buyers lose because they are further outcompeted
by Asian buyers who have an even higher WTP. In the long term, by contrast,
they lose because the competitive intensity in their home market declines.
Asian buyers still have a higher WTP than before, but this additional demand
is now entirely satised by newly installed LNG export capacity.
5.2.4 Some empirical evidence
The model yields predictions on cross-market spillovers that are potentially
empirically testable. An important constraint is the limited availability of
data on the natural gas industry. In particular, even basic information on
production volumes and trade is often only available at an annual frequency.
This makes di¢ cult any econometric analysis around particular market events.
The limited evidence that is available is broadly consistent with the above
results. The Fukushima accident happened on 11 March 2011. No other
large market events appear to have occurred around those days; Fukushima
can be assumed to have dominated the news. Table 1 shows the Platts
JKM (Japan Korea Marker) LNG price and the European gas price NBP (the
UKs National Balancing Point) around the days of the Fukushima accident.
Consistent with Lemma 2, the Asian LNG price rose sharply, by over 20%,
over four trading days following Fukushima. However, the European gas price
also rose by almost 13%. This is in line with the short-term prediction from
Proposition 2 from which Gazprom stood to gain. LNG imports to Europe
peaked in the spring of 2011 and pipeline imports, especially from Russia,
subsequently rose (Stern and Rogers, 2014).
Table 1: Asian LNG prices (JKM) and European gas prices (NBP) around
the Fukushima accident (11 March 2011) in US$/MMbtu (Source: Platts)
10 Mar 11 Mar 14 Mar 15 Mar 16 Mar % change
JKM 9.40 9.90 11.00 10.95 11.35 +20.7%
NBP 9.30 9.60 10.20 10.50 10.50 +12.9%
Testing the longer-term predictions the continuation of a higher Eu-
ropean gas price, greater LNG capacity investment, and Gazprom ultimately
losing market share (Proposition 4) is more di¢ cult. First, while 11 of 53
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nuclear reactors shut down on the day of the accident, Japanese policymakers
closed virtually the entire nuclear eet over the following 12 months, so the
event itself was drawn out. Second, many other factors vary over such a
period time. Third, the observed market response should reect a transition
from short-run impacts to the longer term; all else equal, this is predicted to
be a rise in Gazproms market share, followed by a decline to a level below
that of the status quo ante.
Investment in LNG infrastructure has indeed risen strongly since 2011
(GIIGNL, 2013), and Gazprom is widely seen to have come under pressure in
Europe (Stern and Rogers, 2014). But the extent to which these developments
have indeed been driven by Fukushima is yet to be tested empirically. Future
research may be able to pursue these issues econometrically.
6 Observations on Russian gas export strategy
In May 2014, Russia and China reached agreement on the largest contract
in the history of the natural gas industry.24 The Power of Siberia deal
involves pipeline gas deliveries worth US$400 billion over a 30 year period
commencing in 2018. The price is said to be close to European levels, and
thus well below recent Asian LNG import prices. China may also extend
US$25 billion of nancing to support the development of Eastern Siberian
gaselds and pipeline construction.
This eastward diversication of Russian gas exports may appear puzzling
in light of the preceding game-theoretic analysis. In particular, it seems to
turn Russia into a multi-market exporter and thus expose her to the same
strategic vulnerability of LNG exporters. On closer inspection, however, it
turns out that this conclusion does not follow.
The key observation is that gas sales via pipeline cannot be redirected
between di¤erent end markets in the same way as LNG tankers can. In e¤ect,
the existing western-bound and the new eastern-bound pipeline are di¤erent
capacities, specic to di¤erent gas elds, with no scope for redirection into each
others markets. Therefore, the strategic weakness of multi-market exposure
identied above does not apply.
Two other components of Russian gas export strategy warrant related com-
ment. First, Russia has over the last decade been building a presence in LNG,
though it remains small at around 5% of total gas exports. This LNG comes
exclusively from the Sakhalin-2 project, which has been running since 2009,
with Gazprom partnered with Royal Dutch Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi.25
Again, these LNG exports do not come from the same elds that sell pipeline
gas to Europe; in e¤ect, they represent di¤erent capacity investments. To
date, the project has been selling almost exclusively to Japan and South Ko-
rea, in part because transport costs to Europe or Latin America are high. Yet,
in principle, Gazprom-led LNG exports may become strategically vulnerable.
24The factual background here is based on press reports, especially Gazproms China Gas
Price Said to be Near German Level (Bloomberg, 2 June 2014) and Putin Snubs Europe
with Siberian Gas Deal that Bolsters China Ties(Financial Times, 10 November 2014).
25There is also the Yamal LNG project in the Russian Arctic, which involves Novatek,
Total, and CNPC, and which some observers expect to double Russias share of the global
LNG market over the coming years.
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More generally, this paper demonstrates that diversication of a tradition-
ally pipeline-based exporter into LNG (from the same gas elds) can come at
a strategic cost. So it can be rational for a pipeline seller to reject a seemingly
protable diversication opportunity into LNG so as to protect its existing
business.
Second, and particularly interesting, is the November 2014 announcement
that China and Russia have agreed on a further major gas deal.26 This Altai
deal is fundamentally di¤erent from that of May 2014 it involves pipeline gas
from Western Siberia which has so far gone to European consumers. Some
analysts expect Russia to thus become the new swing producer between
European and Asian markets. So this deal does appear to be exible di-
versication in that it leads to a choice of which export market to deliver
gas from a given Siberian eld. The present analysis suggests that, from a
strategic viewpoint, this deal should be signicantly less attractive to Russia
because it risks undermining Gazproms position in the European market.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper has presented some new results on classic questions on multimarket
competition between rms, with an application to the international gas indus-
try. Instead of rehearsing the arguments made above, this section discusses
some further issues and avenues for future research.
First, this paper has focused, quite narrowly, on a strategic advantage
enjoyed by a rm which serves fewer markets than its rivals. In practice,
uncertainty over demand and costs (and rival behaviour) can play a signicant
role in driving decisions.27 There may be trade-o¤s between committing to
particular investments and retaining exibility to adjust decisions further down
the road. Perhaps multimarket rms are better equipped to deal with, and
benet from, such uncertainty.
Second, the analysis assumed that rms are prot-maximizers. This is a
canonical assumption which seems appropriate for a range of markets. But
it is perhaps less clear to what extent it applies when some actors are state-
controlled entities. It turns out that the results are not overly sensitive to this.
If players instead maximize utility functions, the multimarket rm equalizes
marginal utility across markets. As long as competition remains in strategic
substitutes, the basic insights from the analysis continue to apply; it is more
important that players maximize than what exactly is being maximized.
Third, there is ample scope for more careful empirical work on natural
gas markets. The present paper has derived a number of results that are
empirically testable. One is the competitive advantage of focused pipeline
sellers over LNG exporters in common markets. Another is the predicted
impact of the Fukushima accident; some preliminary evidence was discussed
above but there is clearly room to do more. It would also be valuable to have
empirical evidence on cost pass-through in natural gas markets.
26See Henderson (2014) for another perspective on the recent gas deals between Russia
and China.
27Though the above analysis would be robust to uncertainty in form of additive iid shocks
to demand or costs.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Begin by deriving the equilibrium values ( bK; bx1; by1; by2), and then determine
conditions which ensure that the equilibrium is indeed valid. From the above
discussion, the two remaining unknowns (y1;K2) are pinned down by two equi-
librium conditions. The rst follows from rm 1 equalizing marginal revenues
across markets,MRA1 (K1 y1) MRB1 (y1;K2) = 0, by (1). Using the linearity
of demand in market B, and recalling from (3) that, by prot-maximization
in market A, MRA1 = r1 + c1, and some rearranging gives:
y1 =
(  r1   c1   K2)
2
(8)
The second follows from prot-maximization by rm 2 at Stage 1, recognizing
the strategic e¤ect of its capacity choice, MRB2 + y2 = r2 + c2, from (5):
K2 =
(  r2   c2   y1)
 (2  ) (9)
Solving these two equations simultaneously yields:
y1 =
(  r1   c1)
2
  (  r2   c2   y1)
2 (2  ) (10)
=) by1 = [(2  ) (  r1   c1)  (  r2   c2)]
(3  2) (11)
K2 =
[(  r2   c2)  [(2  ) (  r1   c1)  (  r2   c2)] =(3  2)]
 (2  ) (12)
=) bK2 = [2 (  r2   c2)  (  r1   c1)]
(3  2) (13)
The equilibrium value of the strategic e¤ect  is dened (implicitly) by (6),
evaluated at the equilibrium output in market A. The remaining equilibrium
choices follow immediately from bK1 = bx1 + by1 and by2 = bK2.
Conrming this as a valid solution requires two more steps. First, nding
conditions for this to be an interior equilibrium in which both rms sell strictly
positive amounts to market B. Second, verifying that both rms indeed nd it
optimal to fully use their installed capacity. These conditions are now derived
so as to hold for any possible value of the strategic e¤ect  2 (0; 12).
Step 1 : For rm 1, note that by1 is strictly decreasing in the strategic e¤ect
. It follows that, for any value of , rm 1s output to market B satisesby1 > 32 (  r1   c1)  (  r2   c2) =2, so that:
3
2 (  r1   c1) > (  r2   c2) =) by1 > 0: (14)
This condition can be rearranged as (r1 + c1) < 13 [+ 2 (r2 + c2)]. For rm
2, by inspection, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for positive output is:
2 (  r2   c2) > (  r1   c1)() by2 > 0: (15)
This condition can also be written as (r1 + c1) > [2 (r2 + c2)  ].
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Step 2 : Firm 1 will fully utilize all of its installed capacity as long as this
is prot-maximizing, i.e., where the marginal revenue generated from sales
exceeds the associated costs. Recalling that rm 1 chooses capacity such that
MRA1 = MR
B
1 = r1 + c1, it follows that MR
A
1 = MR
B
1 > c1 (since, by
assumption, r1 > 0). Thus bx1 + by1 = bK1 is indeed optimal.
For rm 2, it similarly must be veried that MRB2 (by1; by2) > c2, with its
marginal revenue evaluated at the equilibrium outputs to market B. Noting
that MRB2 (by1; by2) =    by1   2by2, and using the expressions for outputs
from above shows that:
(  c2) > 3 (  r2   c2)   (  r1   c1)
(3  2) ()MR
B
2 (by1; by2) > c2: (16)
This condition can be rearranged as  (  2c2 + r1 + c1) < 3r2, which is more
di¢ cult to satisfy for higher values of the strategic e¤ect  (since  2c2+c1 >
0 is assumed). Thus letting  = 12 , and some further manipulation shows that
(r1 + c1) < [2 (3r2 + c2)  ] =)MRB2 (by1; by2) > c2; (17)
regardless of the value of . Thus by2 = bK2 is indeed optimal. The three
parameter conditions obtained can be combined into a single condition:
(r1 + c1) 2
 
[2 (r2 + c2)  ] ;min

1
3 [+ 2 (r2 + c2)] ; [2 (3r2 + c2)  ]
	
;
thus completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1
For part (a), inspection of the expression for relative market shares by1=by2 from
(7) shows that it is decreasing in , from which it follows that rm 2s market
share rises with . Firm 2s equilibrium prots are RB2 (by1; by2)  (r2+ c2)by2 =
(1  )(by2)2, since MRB2 + y2 = bpB   (1  )by2 = r2+ c2 by (5), and are
easily checked to rise with  2 (0; 12). Using Lemma 1, equilibrium outputs by
both rms in market B satisfy
by1 + by2 = [(1 + ) (  r1   c1) + (  r2   c2)]
(3  2) : (18)
Total output rises with , so the price bpB falls with  as claimed. Firm
1s equilibrium prots from market B are RB1 (by1; by2)   (r1 + c1)by1 = (by1)2,
since MRB1 = bpB   by1 = r1 + c1 by (3), and decline with  since by1 falls
with . For part (b), the comparison with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
i.e., where  = 0, follows immediately from (a). For part (c), note thatby1=by2 < 1 () [(r2 + c2)  (r1 + c1)] < (=3) (  r1   c1), which clearly can
hold even when r1 + c1 < r2 + c2.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The equilibrium in market A is dened by rm 1s rst-order condition
MRA1 (bx1) = r1 + c1 from (3). For part (a), di¤erentiation gives the impact of
a small demand increase on output:
dbx1
d
=
pA + x1p
A
x
  (2pAx + x1pAxx)

x1=bx1 =
pA (1 + 
A
 )
( pAx )(2  A)

x1=bx1 ; (19)
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using the denitions of A and 
A. The denominator is strictly positive by
the maintained assumption that demand is log-concave, B < 1. The change
in output due to a demand shift from 0 to 00 is given by
bx1(00)  bx1(0) =R 00
0
h
dbx1
d ()
i
d, leading to the rst result. Using (19), the impact of a small
demand increase on the equilibrium price is:
dbpA1
d
= pA + p
A
x
dbx1
d
= pA  
pA + x1p
A
x
(2  A) =
pA

(1  A)  A

(2  A) ; (20)
again with all terms evaluated at x1 = bx1 (). The result again follows frombpA1 (00)  bpB1 (0) = R 000 hdbpA1d ()i d. For part (b), on the output side, the
su¢ cient condition A > 1 for all  2 [0; 00] =) bx1(00) > bx1(0) is immediate.
On the price side, the su¢ cient condition A < (1  A)=A for all  2 [0; 00]
follows since A = 2  1=A.
Proof of Proposition 2
The initial equilibrium is bx1(0) + by1(0) = bK1 and by2(0) = bK2 by Lemma 1.
Begin with the optimal strategy for rm 2 following the demand shift to
00. It maximizes short-run prots maxy2

RB2 (y1; y2)  c2y2
	
subject to the
capacity constraint y2  bK2. Its marginal prot from an additional unit of
output thus equals MRB2 (y1; y2)  c2, which does not depend directly on 00.
Previously under 0, its marginal prot was MRB2 + y2   (r2 + c2). In
the initial equilibrium, this was equal to MRB2 (by1; bK2) +  bK2 jx1=bx1(0)  
(r2 + c2) = 0, by its rst-order condition from (5). Recall that rm 2s ca-
pacity constraint was binding, which required MRB2 (by1; bK2)   c2 > 0 ()
[ bK2 jx1=bx1(0)   r2] < 0 (see the proof of Lemma 1).
Thus comparing marginal prots, MRB2 (y1; y2)   c2  MRB2 (by1; bK2)  
c2 + [ bK2 jx1=bx1(0)   r2] holds if y1  by1(0) (since y2  bK2 by its capacity
constraint). In other words, it is certainly optimal for rm 2 to again sell up
to capacity at 00 whenever rm 1s output is no greater than it was at 0.
Now consider rm 1. By Lemma 2, A >  1 for all  2 [0; 00] is equivalent
to @@MR
A
1 (x1; ) > 0 for all  2 [0; 00]. So the shift from 0 to 00 raises
MRA1 (x1; ) (given x1) but again has no direct e¤ect on MR
B
1 (y1; y2).
The assumption of an interior solution implies that, taking its rivals y2 as
given, rm 1 maximizes its short-term prots by equalizing marginal revenue
across markets,MRA1 (x1; 
00) =MRB1 (y1; y2). Previously under 
0, its optimal
strategy wasMRA1 (x1; 
0) =MRB1 (y1; y2). Since
@
@MR
A
1 (x1; ) > 0, it follows
that, for any given y2, rm 1s optimal x1 is now higher than before, while its
optimal y1 is now lower (because of its capacity constraint).
The short-run equilibriumthus has ex1(00) > bx1(0) and ey1(00) < by1(0),
with ex1(00) + ey1(00) = bK1, for rm 1, and ey2(00) = by2(0) = bK2 for rm 2.
Finally, conrm that it is also optimal for rm 1 to fully use its installed
capacities. Firm 1s marginal revenues in this allocation MRA1 (ex1(00); 00) =
MRB1 (ey1(00); bK2) > MRA1 (bx1(0); 0) = MRB1 (by1(0); bK2) are both higher
than before, so it is again optimal to fully use capacity.
From these results, it is immediate that rm 2s share of marketB has risen,
and that the price has also increased, epB(00) = pB(ey1(00) + ey2(00)) > bpB(0)
(from Lemma 1), thus completing the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 3
For part (a), write


 
00
    0 = R 000 0()d, where di¤erentiation of
() = =[2 +
  pAx ()  2  A ()] gives
0() =
 dd
  pAx ()  2  A ()
2 + ( pAx ())
 
2  A ()2 : (21)
Consider the components of dd
  pAx ()  2  A () in turn:
d
d
  pAx () =   pAx+   pAxx dx1d
=
  pAx+   pAxx  pA + x1pAx
( pAx )
 
2  A
=
  pAx  A  pA + x1pAx 
2  Ax1 since A   pAxxx1=pAx
=   1 
2  A

A
pA
x1
+ 2pAx

=   1 
2  A pAx1  A + 2A  since A  pAxx1=pA . (22)
Next, observe that
d
d
 
2  A () =   d
d
A () . (23)
Combining these results,
d
d
  pAx ()  2  A () =  pAx1  A + 2A     pAx  ddA () ; (24)
and therefore
0() =  
0@
h
pA
x1
 
A () + 2A ()

+
  pAx  ddA ()i
2 + ( pAx ()) (2  A ())
2
1A (25)
which yields the necessary and su¢ cient condition for 
 
00

= 
 
0

+R 00
0 [
0 ()]    0. For part (b), the su¢ cient conditions in terms of cost
pass-through, recall that A = 2  1=A, so A + 2A = 2(1 + A )  1=A and
d
d
A () =   dd
 
1=A

. Then it is clear that jointly su¢ cient for 
 
00

<

 
0

are A < 12
 
1 + A
 1
together with dd
 
1=A
  0 () dA=d  0,
for all  2[0; 00]. Finally, A < 12 () A < 0 and A  0() pAx  0 jointly
imply A < 12
 
1 + A
 1
.
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